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Government Regulation and 
Medium-Sized Business 
Murray Weidenbaum 
The rapid growth of government regulation 
of business in the United States has generated 
widespread concern over its costs and impacts. 
However, virtually all the attention has focused 
on either very large enterprises or very small 
businesses. A substantial database is readily 
available to the researcher in the case of the 
larger companies. As a result, most of the pro-
fessional writing on regulation examines the 
subject from the viewpoint of the large enter-
prise. Simultaneously, a combination of politi-
cal pressures and equity concerns has resulted 
in numerous legislative provisions that exempt 
small firms from regulatory requirements or 
reduce their burden of compliance. 
As a result of these two developments, a 
substantial middle sector of American business 
is neglected in professional as well as public 
policy discussions of regulatory matters. This 
report examines government regulation from 
the viewpoint of the entire array of American 
companies, but with special attention to what is 
the "overlooked middle" sector. Medium-sized 
firms benefit relatively little from the econo-
mies of scale generated by larger units or from 
the legislative protections provided to smaller 
enterprises. 
Murray Weidenbaum is chairman of the Center 
for the Study of American Business at Washing-
ton University in St. Louis. This paper was pre-
sented at the FINOV A Policy Conference on 
Mid-Sized Business in Phoenix, Arizona, on 
March 1, 1996. 
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An Overview of Government 
Regulation 
No regulatory agency has a mission to de-
press the economy or to raise the unemploy-
ment rate. However, many of their actions 
have those undesirable effects. The barriers to 
economic growth imposed by regulatory agen-
cies are numerous and growing. Regulatory 
costs are a hidden tax reducing the competi-
tiveness of American business and the avail-
ability of employment in the United States. 
The popular view of regulation is wrong. It 
is not a contest between the "good guys" 
(government and the consumer) and the "bad 
guys" (business). The reality is that the con-
sumer is at the receiving end of the benefits as 
well as the costs generated by government 
regulation. Business is the middleman (or 
woman). 
The nature of regulation becomes apparent 
when seen from the viewpoint of the average 
company. For each box on its organizational 
chart, there are one or more government agen-
cies that are counterparts to that box: Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) and con-
struction of new facilities, Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA) and the 
workplace, Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) and human resource 
policies, etc. The rules these alphabet soup 
agencies enforce figure heavily in the com-
pany's internal decision making. 
The impact of governmental rule makers is 
in one predictable direction: to increase the 
firm's overhead and operating costs, and to 
reduce the resources available to perform its 
major task of producing goods and services for 
the consumer. Government regulation results 
in the higher prices that consumers pay to 
cover the cost of compliance. But that charac-
teristic makes regulation especially attractive to 
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government officials. The costs do not show 
up in the government's budget (and thus do not 
have to be paid for by taxation). But citizens-
consumers do pay those costs in the form of 
higher prices. 
Regulatory costs are a hidden tax reduc-
ing the competitiveness of American 
business and the availability of 
employment in the United States. 
The EPA says that the cost of complying 
with environmental regulations came to $130 
billion in 1994. That is not a static figure . 
Recently enacted legislation will add new costs 
in terms of billions of dollars a year. When 
researchers add in the costs of meeting the 
rules promulgated by several dozen other 
regulatory agencies ranging from the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) to the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, they 
come up with an aggregate hidden tax of regu-
latory costs of $500 billion a year or more . If 
Congress had to appropriate another $500 bil-
lion a year to cover those costs, it would not 
approve so much regulation. 
Going beyond the dollar signs, more subtle 
and far more serious burdens result from the 
tremendous amounts of regulations that are 
promulgated. Central among these are the ad-
verse effects on research and development, 
productivity, and capital formation. According 
to professor Dale Jorgenson of Harvard Uni-
versity, by the time that the Clean Air Act is 
fully implemented in the year 2005, its impact 
(combined with that of previous environmental 
regulations) will reduce the nation's capital 
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stock by 4.3 percent, increase the cost of capi-
tal by 5.5 percent, and reduce real gross do-
mestic product by more than 3 percent annu-
ally.1 
Regulation also reduces the flow of innova-
tion and the production of new and better prod-
ucts because so many government regulatory 
agencies have the power, which they frequently 
exercise, to decide whether or not a new prod-
uct will go on the market at all. The major 
obstacles to the development of a new biotech-
nology industry are not financial or technologi-
cal. They are regulatory. 
The Regulatory Burden on Middle-Sized 
Companies 
As noted at the outset of this report, a great 
deal of regulatory legislation is so written as to 
lighten the burden on very small firms. How-
ever well motivated, such actions inevitably 
shift the focus of regulatory enforcement to 
other companies. This situation creates special 
difficulty for the medium-sized enterprises that 
cannot afford to maintain specialized staffs to 
deal with environmental, safety, workplace, 
and other complex regulatory requirements. 
One modest-sized company printing T-shirts 
recently bemoaned the fact that the OSHA lev-
ied $2,250 in fines for such "serious" viola-
tions as using two-pronged plugs rather than 
three-pronged ones. The owner noted that if he 
had limited his payroll to ten people - his total 
labor force came to 14 - he would have been 
spared this random inspection aimed at the gi-
ants of the printing industry. 
This adverse experience with government 
regulation is hardly unique. A recent survey 
by the accounting firm of Arthur Andersen re-
ported that, by far, the biggest challenge facing 
mid-sized firms was government regulation. 
Over half of the companies listed regulations as 
the primary hurdle compared to only 18 per-
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Table 1 
Mid-Sized Companies' Biggest Challenges 
Category 
Government regulation 
Health insurance 
Turning a profit 
Taxes 
Capital needs 
Controlling expenses 
Poor economy 
Source: Arthur Andersen and Co. 
Percent 
52 
20 
18 
18 
14 
9 
5 
cent which thought that "turning a profit" was 
the main problem (see Table 1 above). 
The presence of economies of scale in 
complying with government regulation is clear. 
The Fonune 500 fill o"ut pretty much the same 
forms and meet the same requirements as 
smaller firms. The result is that the cost of 
complying with regulation is a higher percent 
of sales for the medium-size company than for 
larger enterprises. A survey of the cost of 
compliance with OSHA rules for different sizes 
of U.S. manufacturers showed very large 
vanatwns. Companies with 2,000 to 5,000 
employees reported an average cost of $237 per 
worker, while companies with 500 to 1 , 000 
employees had to pay almost twice as much -
an average cost of compliance of $467 per 
worker. 
An earlier study of the legal costs to em-
ployers for a National Labor Relations Board 
election reported that companies with 100 to 
149 employees spent $19 per employee eligible 
to vote, more than double the amount ($8) paid 
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by companies with 1,000 or more eligible 
workers. 
Professor Thomas Hopkins of the Rochester 
Institute of Technology has prepared estimates 
of the burdens of complying with federal regu-
lation for different sizes of business (see Table 
2). For companies with 20-499 employees, the 
regulatory burden per employee avera~es 
$5,195 - 78 percent higher than for compames 
with more than 500 employees. Very small 
companies (those with fewer than 20 workers) 
have the highest unit compliance costs - 4 
percent more than mid-sized companies. How-
ever, this small percentage difference is well 
within the likely margin of error in these esti-
mates. 
A 1994 survey of mid-sized manufacturers 
in the United States reported that environmental 
regulations are the most burdensome regula-
tions that they face. In answer to the question, 
"Which one area of government regulation 
would you describe as most burdensome?" 37 
percent responded "environmental." In com-
parison, only 16 percent identified tax regula-
tions, 15 percent work-place health and safety, 
and 4 percent product liability. 
Unfortunately, Congress has responded to 
the issue of uneven distribution of regulatory 
burdens in the predictable manner. It has not 
reduced the burden of regulation by streamlin-
ing the process. Rather, it has exempted dif-
ferent sizes of companies, based arbitrarily on 
the different regulatory statutes it was writing. 
There is a host of regulatory exemptions for 
very small businesses. A facility with nine or 
fewer full-time employees is not required to 
follow the procedures for Toxic Chemical Re-
lease Reporting Under the Emergency Plan-
ning and Community Right-to-Know Act. A 
company with a federal contract (or subcon-
tract) of $25,000 or less does not have to com-
ply with the Drug-Free Workplace Act. A con-
6 
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Table 2 
Federal Regulatory Costs by Size of Firm 
Type of 
Regulation 
Environmental 
Other social 
Economic efficiency 
Economic transfer 
Process 
All federal regulation 
Average Costs per Employee 
for Firms With 
1-19 20-499 500+ 
Employees Employees Employees 
$1.246 $1,194 $671 
658 630 354 
574 550 309 
1,050 890 501 
2,017 1,931 1,086 
$5,545 $5,195 $2,921 
Source: Thomas D. Hopkins, Profiles of Regula-
tory Costs, A Report to the U.S. Small 
Business Administration, November 
1995. 
tractor (or sub-contractor) receiving a federal 
contract of less than $10,000 does not have to 
meet the requirements of the Rehabilitation 
Act. 
For all companies - even those not receiv-
ing a dime from the government - there is a 
bewildering array of size cutoffs, exempting 
some from one regulatory requirement or an-
other. Companies with 14 or fewer employees 
are exempt from the Americans With Disabili-
ties Act and from Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. Employers with 19 or fewer 
workers are exempt from the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act and from the require-
ments of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1985; the latter requires 
employers to provide certain health insurance 
benefits. 
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Firms with 99 or fewer employees are not 
covered by the Worker Adjustment and Re-
training Notification Act. Companies with 99 
or fewer participants in its employee benefit 
plan to not have to file a report each year with 
IRS by an independent qualified accountant. 
There is a cluster of federal regulations that 
take effect when the company hires its 50th 
employee. These include the affirmative action 
program for companies working on government 
contracts, subcontracts, and grants and the 
Family and Medical Leave Act. The primary 
result usually escapes public attention because 
it is less dramatic than the issue of cost but far 
more fundamental: some small firms are reluc-
tant to expand employment. 
For example, WorldClass Process Inc., a 
new and growing Pittsburgh processor of flat-
rolled steel coils, has increased its work force 
to 49. According to the company's chief fi-
nancial officer, "We're going to keep at 49 as 
long as we can," to avoid crossing the 50-
employee threshold for the Family Leave Act. 2 
Similarly, the Schonstedt Instrument Com-
pany of Reston, Virginia, a profitable, high-
tech firm, deliberately keeps its work force 
below 50 employees. It does so to avoid hav-
ing to file Form EE0-1 every year. The com-
pany's president makes the point effectively, 
although not in scholarly fashion: 
. . . a friend went over 50 employees on a 
government contract. He gave me his 
EEO file. . . it weighs more than 8 
pounds ... I have kept my employment 
under 50. 3 
U.S. firms do not entirely escape this prob-
lem when they establish overseas operations. 
In Germany, companies with 10 or more em-
ployees must set up works councils, while in 
8 
Belgium the cutoff is 50 and in France it is 
100. 
The most satisfying answer to this situation 
is not to raise the exemption ceiling now con-
tained in many regulatory statutes. Rather, 
public policy should reduce the proliferation 
and burden of regulation on all companies -
and thus obviate the need for special exemp-
tions to a lucky few. This important objective 
does not require dismantling the regulatory ap-
paratus. It does mean developing more sensi-
ble and effective ways of responding to the 
public's genuine concern for a cleaner envi-
ronment, a safer work place, and other social 
concerns. 
Alternative Approaches to Regulatory 
Reform 
What can be done to reform government 
regulation? At the outset, the reader should be 
aware of the fact that command-and-control 
directives by governments have an ancient 
pedigree. In the Old Testament, the Book of 
Deuteronomy commands, "Thou shall not lend 
upon usury to thy brother." The ancient 
Babylonian Code of Hammurabi established 
uniform weights and measures and limited the 
rate of interest. 
In contrast, most modern economists would 
rely primarily on competition in the market-
place to protect the consumer. Deregulation of 
interstate trucking, for example, has resulted in 
thousands of new businesses entering the mar-
ket. The heightened degree of competition has 
forced sizable reductions in the cost of trucking 
which ultimately shows up in lower prices of 
all the items that move by truck. 
When government does regulate (as in the 
case of environmental pollution), economists 
prefer that government policymakers make the 
maximum use of economic incentives. Thus, 
to an economist the environmental pollution 
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problem is not the negative task of punishing 
wrongdoers. Rather, the challenge is a very 
positive one: to change people's incentives. 
After all , people do not pollute because they 
enjoy messing up the environment. They pol-
lute because it often is cheaper or easier than 
not polluting. 
The basic economic approach is that the 
price of a product should reflect its burden on 
the environment. If prices of goods and serv-
ices were increased to reflect the costs imposed 
on the environment (perhaps as measured by 
cleanup costs), consumers would buy less of 
those environmentally damaging products. The 
idea is to get polluters to change their ways as 
high-polluting products become less attractive 
to consumers than low-polluting products. 
Public policy should reduce the prolif-
eration and burden of regulation on all 
companies - and thus obviate the need for 
special exemptions to a lucky few. 
A study of the Delaware estuary showed 
that effluent fees, set at a high enough level to 
achieve the desired level of water purity, would 
cost only one-half as much as a conventional 
regulatory program to achieve the same envi-
ronmental cleanup. 
What about the existing array of command-
and-control regulation? Here, economists offer 
the notion of benefit-cost analysis to make sure 
that any given regulation does more good than 
harm. Benefit-cost analysis has been used for 
decades in examining government spending 
programs. It is neither a revolutionary, new 
idea nor an invention of the far right. In fact, 
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such analyses have been attacked by both ends 
of the political spectrum. The far left does not 
like using economic analysis because not every 
proposal for government intervention passes a 
benefit-cost test. The far right does not like it 
either, because benefit-cost analysis can be 
used to justify government intervention. 
Benefit-cost tests compensate for the fact 
that government decision makers do not face 
economic constraints. If the costs to society of 
a governmental regulation exceed the benefits, 
that situation does not have an adverse impact 
on the agency . The administrators may not 
even know about it. 
If the costs to society of a governmental 
regulation exceed the benefits, that 
situation does not have an adverse 
impact on the agency. 
Under the traditional approach they can 
crow about the benefits and ignore the costs -
because the costs are transmitted to the con-
sumer, not by the government but by business. 
In fact, regulatory activists can enjoy needling 
business about price increases, even when they 
result from the costs of complying with the 
very regulations that the activists had urged be 
adopted . To an economist, "overregulation" is 
not an emotional term. It is merely shorthand 
for governmental rules for which the costs to 
the public are greater than the benefits. 
In cases where dollars are an inappropriate 
measure of government regulation's impact, 
there still may be opportunity for analysis in 
the decision-making process. For example , the 
drug that cures Rocky Mountain spotted fever 
11 
also causes fatal anemia in one out of every 
10,000 people who use it. A simple-minded 
approach would prohibit the use of this 
"dangerous" drug. Yet, the fever itself kills 
about eight out of every 10 people who contract 
the disease. Thus, the benefits of the drug 
greatly outweighs the costs - measured, not in 
dollar terms, but in human lives. 
Critics who are offended by the notion of 
subjecting regulation to a benefit-cost test un-
wittingly expose the weakness of their position. 
They must fear that their pet rules would flunk 
the test. After all, showing that a regulatory 
activity generates an excess of benefits is a 
strong justification for continuing it. The pain-
ful knowledge that resources available to safe-
guard human lives are limited concerns 
economists when they see wasteful use of those 
resources because of regulation. 
Conclusion 
Now is an especially propitious time for 
Congress to embark upon significant reform 
and reduction of regulation. Such action would 
both respond to the widespread citizen dissatis-
faction with government and improve the lot of 
the overlooked middle-sized company. 
Government decision makers neglect an im-
portant fact when they adopt new or expanded 
regulatory requirements: government inter-
vention often does more harm than good. Poli-
cymakers should not ignore the tremendous 
ability of individuals and private organizations 
to deal with the shortcomings that inevitably 
arise in a modern economy. 
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